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 On the 5
th
 anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center, the National Institute of Justice—the 
research, development, and evaluation agency of the U.S. 
Department of Justice—published a major report on the 
identification of mass disaster victims using DNA analysis. 
The report was prepared by the Kinship and Data Analysis 
Panel, a multidisciplinary group of scientists assembled by 
the National Institute of Justice to offer guidance to the New 
York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in the 
identification of those who perished in the World Trade 
Center. 
 Although Lessons Learned From 9/11: DNA 
Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents is designed primarily 
to help the Nation’s crime laboratory directors respond to 
future mass fatality disasters—be they natural disasters, large 
transportation accidents, or terrorist events—a variety of 
issues in the report concern the intersection of criminal 
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justice and forensics, particularly as it relates to using DNA 
analysis to identify victims when other identification methods 
are not enough.  
 
WHY DNA ANALYSIS? 
 
 DNA analysis is the newest of several methods used to 
identify human remains. (Other methods of identification 
include obvious physical attributes, such as birthmarks, 
tattoos, medical implants, clothing and jewelry); forensic 
anthropology; fingerprints; odontology; and radiology.) The 
need to use DNA analysis also may occur when the condition 
of human remains are fragmented and/or commingled due to 
the type of event or the duration of the recovery effort. When 
sufficient quantities of DNA from biological and “reference” 
samples exist, DNA profiling can be uniquely identifying.  
 DNA identifications are made by comparing DNA 
profiles from human remains to DNA profiles from reference 
samples. There are several potential sources of reference 
samples: (1) personal items used by the victim (for example, 
a toothbrush, hairbrush, or razor) and banked samples from 
the victim (for example, sperm or biopsy tissue that has been 
stored in a medical facility); (2) biological relatives of the 
victim (called “kinship samples”); and (3) human remains 
previously identified through other methods or other 
fragmented remains already typed by DNA.  
 
THE FIRST 48 HOURS 
 
 The hours and days immediately following a mass fatality 
incident are inevitably chaotic. Within the first 48 hours, a 
laboratory director will likely be faced with a number of  
potentially “competing” issues, including responding to 
requests from elected officials, government agencies, the 
media, the victims’ families, and the laboratory staff. 
Decisions made during these first 48 hours largely will 
determine the efficiency and efficacy of the DNA 
identification effort. Lessons Learned From 9/11: DNA 
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Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents addresses some of 
these decisions, including: 
 
 Are there sufficient people, resources, equipment, and 
funding to support the effort? 
 
 What agencies/departments will interact with the 
laboratory? Who are the points-of-contact? 
 
 Which agencies/departments will be in charge of 
specific activities—for example, collecting reference 
samples, collecting disaster samples, administration of 
funding? 
 
 How and when will the laboratory director assess the 
degree to which samples are compromised (e.g., 
fragmentation, commingling, degradation)?  
 
 How, when, and by whom will reference samples be 
collected?  
 
 How will staff and resources be reorganized to handle 
the ongoing casework and the increased casework due 
to the mass fatality incident? 
 
 Who will be the point of contact with the media? 
 
 Will the laboratory outsource DNA testing? Which 
testing? To whom? 
 
 How will progress in the DNA identification effort be 
relayed to family members, elected officials, and the 
media? 
 
 What will the laboratory’s policy be if there is a 
situation in which the genetic relationship is not 
consistent with the biological relationship reported by 
the family? 
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Other “policy-related” parameters of a mass fatality DNA 
identification effort must also be established, such as:  
 
 HOW IMPORTANT IS DNA TO THE IDENTIFICATION 
EFFORT? 
 
 The degree to which human remains are fragmented or 
degraded determines the value of DNA analysis in the 
identification process. Large body parts lend themselves to 
identification by less costly methods, such as X-ray, dental 
examination, and fingerprints. However, DNA analysis is the 
only viable method for identifying severely fragmented or 
degraded remains. Even when whole bodies are recovered, 
DNA analysis still may be the best approach when materials 
that are necessary for other methods of identification—for 
example, dental records or verified body identification by 
friends or relatives—are unavailable.  
 
WILL EVERY PERSON OR EVERY FRAGMENT BE  
IDENTIFIED? 
 
 The answer to this question frames the scope of the DNA 
identification effort. Obviously, intact bodies will require 
fewer testings than fragmented remains, although 
decomposing bodies may not easily yield full profiles. For 
example, in an airplane crash with 50 victims, in which each 
victim’s remains are fragmented into many pieces, the 
identification effort will end sooner if the goal is to identify 
each victim, rather than each fragment of human remains. 
Everyone—the public, the policymakers, and the laboratory 
personnel—needs to understand the answer to the important 
question: “When are we finished?”  
 If the policy is to identify all of the victims, DNA analysis 
would stop as soon as the last victim is identified, which 
means that some human remains may never be analyzed or 
returned to the families. However, when the goal of the effort 
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is the attempted identification of all fragments, the work of 
the laboratory likely will be greater and take much longer.  
 It is important to consider that, if a mass fatality incident 
is so large and devastating that it affects the psyche of a 
community, a country, or the world, the scope of the 
identification effort may be broadened to help acknowledge 
the breadth of the emotional ramifications. After the 9/11 
attacks, for example, the Mayor of New York City directed 
the Office of Chief Medical Examiner to do everything 
humanly possible to identify every fragment of human 
remains. And fragmented remains found over five years later 
were subjected to analysis for that reason.  
 
WHAT IS THE MINIMUM FRAGMENT SIZE THAT  
WILL BE IDENTIFIED? 
 
 Policies also need to be established at the beginning of the 
effort that define “minimum fragment size” for DNA testing. 
A policy that has as a goal “all remains tested” may mean that 
many fragments may fail to yield results. In this situation, the 
DNA effort would take longer and be more costly—and, 
although families would be more likely to receive more of 
their loved one’s remains, they may be unprepared for the 
fragmentary condition of the remains or the length of time it 
takes to identify them.    
  
WHAT WILL BE THE IMPACT ON A LABORATORY’S  
ROUTINE CASEWORK? 
 
 The impact of a mass fatality incident response on the 
laboratory’s primary mission—processing routine, criminal 
casework—must be considered. As resources are redirected 
to a mass fatality identification effort, backlog and 
turnaround times for regular casework are likely to increase. 
Even though law enforcement officials and officers of the 
court may support the laboratory’s role in a mass fatality 
incident response, they may still expect their cases to be 
completed in a timely manner.  
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CHAIN-OF-CUSTODY ISSUES 
 
 Most lawyers are familiar with traditional chain-of-
custody issues, including the handling of evidence and how it 
is presented in the courtroom. In identifying victims of a 
mass fatality incident through DNA, however, chain-of-
custody issues are multiplied exponentially due to the sheer 
number of samples—human remains, personal reference 
items, and samples from next of kin—needed to identify the 
victims.  
 Although chain-of-custody issues impact nearly every 
stage of a DNA identification effort, the collection of samples 
may be the most critical and frequently overlooked. In the 
urgency to identify the victims, there may be little attention 
paid to how the remains are collected. Therefore, protocols 
for chain-of-custody documentation in collecting evidence 
and handling samples must be a part of a laboratory’s mass 
fatality incident plan. This is important not only for scene 
reconstruction and quality control, but also for any 
subsequent legal proceedings.  
 One of the most important initial decisions that must be 
made is whether to treat the incident as a humanitarian effort, 
civil incident, or criminal matter. This decision will drive 
chain-of-custody requirements. In a natural disaster, for 
example, the identification effort is largely humanitarian: 
identifying the victims so that their remains can be returned 
to the families and a death certificate and other 
documentation can be issued. However, when a mass fatality 
results from criminal activity, the identification effort has 
humanitarian and investigative components. In a criminal 
matter, the medical examiner may be involved in identifying 
the perpetrators and assisting with the law enforcement 
investigation.  
 Chain-of-custody issues can be complicated by the size 
and quality of the DNA from victims’ remains. For example, 
environmentally harsh conditions at the incident site may 
limit the quantity of typable DNA recoverable from human 
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remains. Also, there may be a paucity of reference samples 
from close biological relatives or from victims’ personal 
effects. For example, airline passengers often travel with their 
toothbrushes and hairbrushes, and these items may be lost or 
destroyed in an airline disaster. Kinship samples may be 
unavailable or scarce because the victim had few living 
biological relatives or because the relatives are unable or 
choose not to participate in the identification effort.  
 The chaotic environment at a mass disaster site can lead 
to sample mix-ups. Careful planning must take place to 
establish guidelines for collection, handling, and preservation 
of all samples to ensure accuracy throughout the process. The 
commingling of remains presents another potential problem. 
After a remains sample is analyzed, the laboratory may 
discover that it belongs to two or more individuals. The DNA 
may show that the bone and tissue come from different 
donors, as happened in World Trade Center (WTC), where 
remains were severely compacted.  
 Documenting the chain of custody of personal effects 
used as reference samples—for example, toothbrushes, 
razors, medical biopsy samples, and clothing—can also 
present challenges. For example, there may be inadvertent 
reference-sample switching by bereft loved ones. Or there 
may be name misspellings or unlinked nicknames associated 
with the same last name. In addition, family members may 
state with certainty that their missing relative was the only 
one to have contact with a personal effect that is brought in 
for DNA testing; but then, DNA analysis may show the 
profiles of two or more persons, further complicating the 
process. In some mass fatalities, such as a tidal wave, 
personal effects belonging to victims can be lost or 
contaminated at the site itself. Therefore, managing sample 
collection and tracking in a controlled, documented fashion is 
essential to a DNA identification process. 
 
BEYOND CHAIN OF CUSTODY 
 Although “Lessons Learned From 9/11: DNA 
Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents” deals extensively 
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with laboratory protocols that can ensure proper chain-of-
custody documentation, these form only one part of the 
identification process. Potential legal ramifications can 
extend far beyond traditional chain-of-custody procedures 
and documentation. Other major issues are as wide-ranging 
as dealing with the press, privacy, and working with an 
advisory panel of experts and/or bioethicists, and a prudent 
laboratory director will be ever-mindful of the potential for 
civil action. Such litigation could arise out of 
misidentification, release of information, control of remains, 
and intellectual property assertions regarding the 
development of new identification techniques. The report 
offers guidance regarding the need for a laboratory director to 
work closely with contracting officers and attorneys on issues 
such as contracts, intellectual property rights, and privacy 
issues, including the creation of a next-of-kin release policy.  
 There also are potential liability issues to consider if 
consultants or volunteers are used. It may be advisable, for 
example, to have consultants and volunteers sign a 
confidentiality agreement, stating that no data or information 
related to the DNA identification effort may be published or 
conveyed to the media without prior written consent of the 
laboratory director. Such an agreement might also state that 
no personal information should be disclosed regarding the 
victims, the state of the remains, or any other aspect of the 
incident that the consultant or volunteer learns as a result of 
working on the DNA identification effort. A comprehensive 
confidentiality agreement can help protect the laboratory 
from premature, unconfirmed reports and the victims’ loved 
ones from insensitive divulging of gruesome details. 
 
MANAGING EXPECTATIONS 
 
 As most lawyers know, “expectations”—held by a judge, 
jurors, or the public—can play a role in any legal case, 
including one that might arise after a mass fatality disaster 
and the subsequent identification of victims. For example, a 
laboratory director managing to a large DNA-based 
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identification effort will likely encounter a host of new 
constituents and all of them—the victims’ families, public 
officials, the media, and the general public—will have 
expectations about the technology of DNA analysis and a 
timeline for DNA-based identifications. Lessons Learned 
From 9/11: DNA Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents 
addresses some of these concerns. 
 Although everyone likely will seek the same outcome—
the maximum number of identifications and the maximum 
quantity of remains accurately returned to the family—their 
priorities may not be the same. Elected officials, for example, 
may focus on the speed of the identification process, whereas 
the laboratory’s primary focus may be with the quality of the 
collection and analysis processes. Although these goals are 
not mutually exclusive, they may occasionally clash.  
 Also, as lawyers who have had to deal with DNA analysis 
and evidence already know, the public—including public 
officials and the media—knows little about the realities of 
DNA identification analysis, popular television shows 
notwithstanding. The public will have to be educated in order 
to develop realistic expectations about the speed and power 
of DNA testing, including the fact that some of the victims 
and some of the remains may not be identified.  
 
SPECIAL REQUESTS 
 
 It is possible that lawyers may be involved in requests for 
special sample handling after a mass fatality event. The first 
hours after a major incident will be emotionally charged, with 
the possibility of many urgent requests that the laboratory 
perform immediate DNA analyses. Requests for expedited 
analyses may also occur later in the identification effort, if 
new remains are recovered or more useful personal items or 
relative references become available. In the World Trade 
Center DNA identification, for example, the laboratory 
frequently received instructions to collect and analyze 
reference samples—and compare them to already analyzed 
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DNA profiles in the hopes of making an identification—
within 24 hours or less.  
 
MEDIA RELATIONS 
 
 Because DNA technology is of such interest to the public, 
there are likely to be many DNA-related questions from the 
media—and lawyers may play a variety of roles in media 
relations and how information is given to the public.  
 Lessons Learned From 9/11: DNA Identification in Mass 
Fatality Incidents advises laboratory directors to be prepared 
to answer questions such as: 
 How many victims have been identified? 
 Have you identified the terrorists? 
 How much time until the work is finished? Why is it 
taking so long? 
 Will you be able to identify everyone? How many 
victims will you be able to identify? Why can’t you 
identify all of them?   
 What is the condition of the remains?   
 
 In addition, the issue of commingled remains may be a 
particularly sensitive one for families. And, the media may 
focus on new or unusual technologies, seeking information 
on their reliability, when they will be brought online, and 
how many new identifications they will yield. In addition, 
some reporters may want to “scoop” their competition and, 
because of this and the pressure on them to meet short 
deadlines, there often is insufficient time for a story to be 
vetted as fully as the scientific community would like. 
Unfortunately, some of what gets printed or broadcast may 
contain errors. If this happens, the gulf between perception 
and reality can create anxiety and confusion among the 
victims’ families and the general public.  
 Most DNA laboratories will have no experience in 
working with the families of victims of a mass fatality 
incident. This report discusses the formation of family 
assistance centers and hotlines—and contains a number of 
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helpful forms, including the most recent version (in English 
and in Spanish) of a brochure on the DNA identification 
process that was distributed to victims’ families after the 9/11 
attacks. 
 Mostly, the families of victims simply want information. 
Most laypeople do not understand forensic identification 
modalities, and DNA can seem especially mysterious. Often, 
families do not know why they are being asked to provide 
their loved one’s personal items or why the laboratory is 
requesting DNA samples from relatives. Some families may 
be concerned at what they perceive as the government asking 
questions about their DNA or their relationship to a mass 
fatality incident victim. Also, once DNA samples are 
provided, families may not hear anything for days, weeks, or 
even months, which can cause additional anxiety about the 
government’s use of their DNA. The entire process can be 
bewildering and frustrating to the families of victims, which 
is why a laboratory’s policies regarding sample disposition, 
privacy, and other personal information should be 
communicated clearly and respectfully. 
 Other issues that lawyers may be involved in include 
obtaining reference samples from a family member who was 
estranged from a victim, or situations in which biological 
relationships are discovered, upon DNA analysis, to be not as 
reported. In such cases, it may be advisable to consult with a 
bioethicist (see www.bioethics.net).   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Through the President’s DNA Initiative, Advancing 
Justice Through DNA Technology, a 5-year multi-million 
dollar program, NIJ is committed to providing funding, 
training, and assistance to assure that forensic DNA reaches 
its full potential to solve crimes, protect the innocent and 
identify missing persons (see www.dna.gov). Even before 
NIJ published Lessons Learned From 9/11: DNA 
Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents, we provided 
guidance to officials who were involved in the identification 
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of victims of the Southeast Asia tsunami (December 2004), 
and of Hurricane Katrina (August 2005), a disaster that 
revealed how any State or municipality can be overwhelmed 
by the operational requirements of responding to a mass 
fatality event.  
 As I said at the beginning of Lessons Learned From 9/11: 
DNA Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents, it is only 
through planning, training, and vigilant assessments of the 
capabilities of our public forensic laboratories that laboratory 
directors—and the policymakers who fund them—can 
prepare for a mass fatality event. Only through diligent 
planning can we ensure that our public resources are used as 
efficiently as possible. I believe this report will help us 
accomplish that mission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
